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LEWIS, Circuit Judge. 
 This appeal deals principally with only one issue:  
whether the district court properly relied upon section 
1B1.11(b)(2) of the United States Sentencing Guidelines 
("U.S.S.G." or "guidelines") in calculating the sentence it 
imposed in this case.  Section 1B1.11(b)(2) is, in essence, the 
United States Sentencing Commission's codification of the 
so-called "one book rule," the practice of applying only one 
version of the guidelines when calculating a defendant's 
sentence.  Prior to its codification, we had expressly 
disapproved the "one book rule"; thus, we are called upon to 
reconcile our prior rejection with its subsequent codification.  
Because we conclude that the Sentencing Commission's adoption of 
the "one book rule" is binding, we will affirm the district 
court's judgment of sentence in this regard.1 
                     
1
.   Corrado's appeal raised three additional challenges to the 
sentence the district court imposed, but because of certain 
concessions made by both sides prior to, during and after oral 
argument (some of which will require a remand), the only "live" 
issue on appeal is the one discussed above. 
 
 Specifically, Corrado claimed that the district court erred 
in computing his criminal history score by using a prior 
  
 I. 
 During a period from June 1985 through May 1988, 
Corrado was involved in the operation of a stolen car ring and 
"chop shop," as well as a conspiracy to defraud Stereo 
Discounters Electronic World, Inc., an electronics retailer.  
Corrado entered a guilty plea to two counts of a 38-count 
indictment and, in November 1993, was sentenced to two concurrent 
57-month terms of imprisonment.2  Pursuant to section 
(..continued) 
misdemeanor shoplifting conviction which was (a) uncounseled, and 
(b) constituted a "local ordinance violation."  Corrado later 
withdrew both contentions, acknowledging that the Supreme Court 
has explicitly held that a court may consider a defendant's prior 
uncounseled misdemeanor conviction without offending the Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel (Nichols v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 
1921, 1928 (1994)), and that the offense had been prosecuted as a 
state misdemeanor rather than a local ordinance violation. 
 
 Corrado had also claimed that the district court improperly 
considered a prior conviction for interstate transportation of 
stolen goods which had been set aside under the Youth Corrections 
Act ("YCA"), 18 U.S.C. § 5021(a), and erred in imposing two 
five-year terms of supervised release, which were in excess of 
the statutory maximum set forth in U.S.S.G. §5D2.1(b), which 
provides for a term of "at least two but not more than three 
years . . . ."  The government conceded that the terms of 
supervised release exceeded the statutory maximum and should be 
reduced on remand, and we agree.  The government also conceded 
that if Corrado's prior conviction for interstate transportation 
of stolen goods was, in fact, set aside under the YCA, it should 
not have been included in computing Corrado's criminal history 
score.  We agree with the government that "this question should 
be remanded to the district court for a determination of whether 
or not the particular sentence at issue here . . . was a YCA 
sentence."  Appellee's Br. at 22.  Accordingly, we will remand to 
the district court for resentencing under U.S.S.G. §5D1.2(b) with 
respect to the terms of supervised release, and for 
reconsideration of Corrado's criminal history score following a 
determination of whether the conviction was set aside under the 
YCA. 
2
.   The sentence was based on a criminal history category of V 
and a total offense level of 19.  The number 19, which represents 
  
1B1.11(b)(1) of the November 1993 version of the guidelines (the 
edition in effect at the time of Corrado's sentencing), the 
district court looked to the 1987 version of the guidelines (the 
edition in effect at the time Corrado committed his crimes) to 
calculate the sentence.  The court pursued this regimen because 
application of the 1993 version of the guidelines would have 
resulted in Corrado receiving a more severe sentence than he 
could have anticipated when he committed his crimes.  See 
U.S.S.G. §1B1.11(b)(1) (1993) (directing courts to use the 
guidelines in effect at the time the offense was committed if the 
guidelines in effect at the time of sentencing would violate the 
Constitution's ex post facto clause).  As part of the calculation 
of Corrado's sentence, the district court granted the two-level 
reduction for acceptance of responsibility available under the 
1987 guidelines.  See U.S.S.G. §3E1.1(a) (1987). 
 Corrado now argues that the district court erred 
because it did not grant him a three-level downward adjustment -- 
the maximum reduction available under the 1993 version of the 
guidelines for acceptance of responsibility.  See U.S.S.G. §3E1.1 
(1993). 
(..continued) 
the higher of the two offense levels produced after levels for 
each count were calculated, see U.S.S.G. §3D1.2(d) (Nov. 1987) 
(requiring that counts be grouped when they involve substantially 
the same harm) and §3D1.3(b) (Nov. 1987) (requiring use of 
highest offense level produced when offenses are grouped), was 
based upon a base offense level of six; which was increased by 
eight due to the amount of monetary loss involved; which was then 
increased by two for more than minimal planning; then by three 
because Corrado was a manager; then by two for obstruction of 
justice; and which was then decreased by two for acceptance of 
responsibility. 
  
 We have jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a). 
 II. 
 As a general rule, a defendant's sentence should be 
based on the guidelines "that are in effect on the date that the 
defendant is sentenced."  United States v. Menon, 24 F.3d 550, 
566 (3d Cir. 1994); United States v. Cherry, 10 F.3d 1003, 1014 
(3d Cir. 1994); United States v. Kopp, 951 F.2d 521, 526 (1991); 
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(4); U.S.S.G. §1B1.11(a) (1993).  When, 
however, the retroactive application of the version of the 
guidelines in effect at sentencing results in more severe 
penalties than those in effect at the time of the offense, the 
earlier version controls, United States v. Seligsohn, 981 F.2d 
1418, 1424 (3d Cir. 1992), citing Kopp, 951 F.2d at 526; see also 
United States v. Pollen, 978 F.2d 78, 90 (3d Cir. 1992); United 
States v. Chasmer, 952 F.2d 50, 52 (3d Cir. 1991); U.S.S.G 
§1B1.11(b)(1) (1993), since, as already noted, to apply a change 
in the guidelines that enhances the penalty would offend the ex 
post facto clause of the United States Constitution.  See Miller 
v. Florida, 482 U.S. 423, 431-35 (1987); Menon, 24 F.3d at 566; 
U.S. Const. Art. I, § 9.  Moreover, if the application of the 
guideline manual in effect at the time of sentencing would 
violate the ex post facto clause, the manual in effect on the 
date of the offense should be used in its entirety.  U.S.S.G. 
§1B1.11(b)(2) (1993) (emphasis added).  The practice of applying 
  
only one version of the guidelines when calculating a defendant's 
sentence has been referred to as the "one book rule".3 
 It is undisputed that the district court correctly 
looked to the 1987 version of the guidelines in determining 
Corrado's sentence.  Indeed, there is no question but that 
Corrado would have received a more severe sentence had the 1993 
guidelines been applied.  Under the 1987 guidelines, Corrado's 
offense level was increased by eight levels to account for the 
monetary loss he caused, while under the 1993 guidelines the same 
loss would have resulted in an eleven-level increase.4  Compare 
U.S.S.G. §2F1.1(b)(1)(I) (1987) with U.S.S.G. §2F1.1(b)(1)(L) 
(1993).  This difference meant that, even with the three-level 
acceptance of responsibility adjustment, Corrado's applicable 
range under the 1993 guidelines would have been 70 to 87 months, 
                     
3
.   Section 1B1.11(b)(2) provides in pertinent part: 
 
  The Guidelines Manual in effect on a 
particular date shall be applied in its 
entirety.  The court shall not apply, for 
example, one guideline section from one 
edition of the Guidelines Manual and another 
guideline section from a different edition of 
the Guidelines Manual. 
 
U.S.S.G. §1B1.11(b)(2), p.s. (1992). 
4
.   The parties stipulated that the loss caused by each of the 
two counts of conviction was $600,000, or a total of $1.2 
million.  Thus, since the grouping requirements provide that the 
dollar amounts be aggregated, the Presentence Report indicated 
that the total amount of loss, for the purposes of calculating 
Corrado's sentence, was $1.2 million.  Presentence Report at 9, 
¶ 41; see U.S.S.G. §3D1.2(d) (1987).  The district court, 
however, found that the total monetary loss was "less than 
$1,000,000."  App. at 10.  This finding does not affect our 
analysis. 
  
while under the 1987 guidelines, with the two-level reduction, 
his sentencing range was only 57 to 71 months. 
 III. 
 Corrado suggests that the district court should have 
used the 1987 version of the guidelines when calculating his 
adjusted offense level and the 1993 version when determining the 
maximum permissible downward adjustment for acceptance of 
responsibility.  He argues that because 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(4) 
requires that sentences be calculated according to the guidelines 
in effect at the time of sentencing, he is entitled to the 
benefit of the 1993 provision governing acceptance of 
responsibility.  In essence, Corrado challenges the district 
court's decision to apply the 1987 guidelines as a whole rather 
than considering each provision in isolation and applying only 
those provisions from the 1987 version of the guidelines which 
are more favorable.  In support of his position, Corrado advances 
two distinct arguments.  First, he claims that the district court 
was free to disregard section 1B1.11(b)(2) because it is "not a 
guideline as such, rather it is a policy statement[,] . . . 
[which is] not binding on the sentencing court."  Appellant's Br. 
at 17-18.  Corrado also contends that the application of section 
1B1.11, itself, violates the ex post facto clause; according to 
Corrado, but for that provision, which was added to the 
guidelines after he committed his crimes, the district court 
would have been free to apply the 1987 guidelines in determining 
his adjusted offense level and the 1993 provision for acceptance 
  
of responsibility -- a process which would have resulted in a 
more favorable sentence. 
 We have plenary review of issues of law raised by the 
application of the guidelines.  United States v. Mobley, 956 F.2d 
450, 451 (3d Cir. 1992).  We will address Corrado's contentions 
in turn. 
 A. 
 Corrado's claim that the district court was not bound 
to follow section 1B1.11(b)(2) because it is a policy statement 
rather than a guideline is, quite simply, mistaken.  The 
Guideline Manual contains three varieties of text:  guidelines 
provisions, policy statements and commentary.  Title 28 of the 
United States Code at section 994, draws an unequivocal 
distinction between "guidelines," 28 U.S.C. § 994(a)(1), and 
"general policy statements regarding the application of the 
guidelines," 28 U.S.C. § 994(a)(2), as do other sections of the 
statute.  See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 994(a)(3) (referring 
specifically to "guidelines or general policy statements"); 
§ 994(c) (referring specifically to "guidelines and policy 
statements").  Policy statements, unlike the guidelines, are not 
subject to formal legislative review and do not have the same 
degree of authority as guidelines.  See United States v. Gaskill, 
991 F.2d 82, 85 (3d Cir. 1993).  The Supreme Court, however, has 
stated that "[t]he principle that the Guidelines Manual is 
binding on federal courts applies as well to policy statements."  
Stinson v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 1913, 1917 (1993).  
Furthermore, where "a policy statement prohibits a district court 
  
from taking a specified action, the statement is an authoritative 
guide to the meaning of the applicable guideline."  Williams v. 
United States, 503 U.S. 193, 201 (1992);5 United States v. 
Reilly, 33 F.3d 1396, 1424 n.21 (3d Cir. 1994).  In this case, 
the policy statement at issue expressly prohibits district courts 
                     
5
.   Corrado urges us to consider United States v. Dawson, 990 
F.2d 1314 (D.C. Cir. 1993), wherein the Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia limited Williams v. United States, 112 S. 
Ct. 1112, 1119 (1992), to situations in which a policy statement 
explains an applicable guideline.  In this regard, the Dawson 
court stated: 
 
  The Government can take no comfort in 
[Williams] which it cited for the general 
proposition that there is no meaningful 
distinction between the guidelines and policy 
statements . . . .  The Court in Williams did 
not address whether a policy statement 
promulgated in the absence of a corresponding 
guideline is a valid exercise of the 
Commission's authority.  Rather, the Court 
apparently assumed that the policy statement 
at issue in Williams explained an applicable 
guideline.  By contrast, in this case there 
is no guideline applicable to the 
determination . . . . 
 
Dawson, 990 F.2d at 1319. 
 
 Corrado suggests that this case is analogous to Dawson 
because section 1B1.11(b)(2) "was not promulgated to explain an 
underlying guideline, rather, it is a policy statement which 
stands alone, seeking to reconcile 18 U.S.C § 3553(a)(4),(5)[;] 
the ex post facto clause[;] congressional intent and the 
Commission's own policy concerns."  Appellant's Br. at 19.  
Although we do not read Williams as narrowly as the Dawson court 
did, we do not believe the more limited view would change the 
result in this case.  Corrado correctly notes that section 
1B1.11(b)(2) does not correspond to a particular guideline.  The 
policy statement does, however, explain how the applicable 
guidelines shall be applied.  The fact that section 1B1.11(b)(2) 
pertains to many guidelines rather than a single guideline is, in 
our view, of little significance to the determination of whether 
the section is binding on sentencing courts. 
  
from doing precisely what Corrado suggests the district court 
here should have done -- namely, to mix and match provisions from 
different versions of the guidelines in order to tailor a more 
favorable sentence.  Because of its prohibitive nature, as well 
as the fact that we believe applying various provisions taken 
from different versions of the guidelines would upset the 
coherency and balance the Sentencing Commission obviously 
intended in promulgating the guidelines, see United States v. 
Kikamura, 918 F.2d 1084, 1109 (3d Cir. 1990), we conclude that 
section 1B1.11(b)(2) is binding and, as such, was properly 
followed by the district court in this case. 
 We need not reach Corrado's claim that the district 
court "was obligated to . . . follow the approach established by 
the Third Circuit" in Kopp and Seligsohn.  See Appellant's Br. at 
19.  Although we previously held that the "so-called [one book] 
rule is inconsistent with United States v. Kopp and other cases 
in this Court[,]" and "expressly disapprove[d] of the `one book' 
practice as in conflict with the Kopp opinion[,]" Seligsohn, 981 
F.2d at 1424, the Sentencing Commission, through its adoption of 
section 1B1.11(b)(2), has effectively overruled those opinions 
insofar as they conflict with the codification of the "one book 
rule."  Of course, we hasten to note that to the extent these 
decisions do not conflict with section 1B1.11(b)(2), their 
vitality remains. 
  
 B. 
 Corrado's second claim -- that because the "one book 
rule" was not in effect at the time of his offenses, its 
application violates the ex post facto clause -- is likewise 
unavailing.  The ex post facto clause "forbids the imposition of 
punishment more severe than the punishment assigned by law when 
the act to be punished occurred."  Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 
28 (1981).  Significantly, Corrado's sentence was, in fact, 
imposed pursuant to the law in effect at the time he committed 
his crimes.  Corrado had "fair warning" of the specific 
punishment prescribed for his crimes, see Miller v. Florida, 482 
U.S. at 430-431, and of the maximum available reduction for 
acceptance of responsibility which was two levels.  It is true 
that Corrado could not have predicted that the "one book rule" 
would have required him to be sentenced under the 1987 version of 
the guidelines, thus prohibiting him from receiving an additional 
one-level decrease for acceptance of responsibility.  Of course, 
it is equally true that Corrado could not have forecast that a 
more favorable provision for acceptance of responsibility might 
exist in 1993.  But the impossibility of prognostication under 
these circumstances is not at all analogous to "the lack of fair 
notice" which, from the outset, has been recognized as central to 
the ex post facto prohibition.  See Miller, 482 U.S. at 430, 
citing Weaver, 450 U.S. at 30.  The ex post facto clause protects 
defendants from future legislation which "increases punishment 
beyond what was prescribed when the crime was consummated."  Id. 
  
 The sentencing guidelines are subject to continuous 
review and revision.  Some changes might benefit a defendant 
while others might operate to his or her detriment.  In this 
case, the application of the 1987 guidelines, pursuant to section 
1B1.11(b)(2), resulted in a sentence of at least thirteen months 
less than what Corrado would have received under the 1993 
guidelines.  In our view, where, as here, the applicable 
guidelines overall work to the defendant's advantage in terms of 
the sentence imposed, there is no ex post facto violation.  See 
United States v. Bertoli, 40 F.3d 1384, 1404 n.17 (3d Cir. 1994). 
 IV. 
 In determining that section 1B1.11(b)(2) is binding and 
that its application does not offend the ex post facto clause, we 
join the majority of other courts of appeal which have already 
upheld the application of the "one book rule."  See e.g. United 
States v. Nelson, 36 F.3d 1001, 1004 (10th Cir. 1994) (stating 
that a defendant may not select piecemeal from different versions 
of the guidelines to come up with the most advantageous 
combination of provisions from the two books); United States v. 
Springer, 28 F.3d 236, 237-38 (1st Cir. 1994) (upholding section 
1B1.11(b)(2) and finding application of the one book rule did not 
violate the ex post facto clause); United States v. Lance, 23 
F.3d 343, 344 (11th Cir. 1994) (refusing to "mix and match" 
amended provisions to reach a more favorable sentence); United 
States v. Boula, 997 F.2d 263, 265-66 (7th Cir. 1993) (refusing 
to apply guidelines in "piecemeal fashion"); United States v. 
Warren, 980 F.2d 1300, 1305-06 (9th Cir. 1992) (rejecting 
  
"piecemeal application of the guidelines"); United States v. 
Lenfesty, 923 F.2d 1293, 1299 (8th Cir. 1991) (refusing 
defendant's request to receive application of favorable change in 
guidelines while continuing to receive the benefit of a provision 
under previous version of the guidelines); United States v. 
Stephenson, 921 F.2d 438, 441 (2d Cir. 1990) (concluding that 
"applying various provisions from different versions of the 
guidelines would upset the coherency and balance the Commission 
achieved in promulgating the Guidelines").  In addition, and 
perhaps more important, our conclusion is consistent with the 
Commission's obvious intention that the guidelines operate as a 
cohesive and integrated whole.  
 V. 
 For the reasons set forth above, we will affirm the 
district court's application of the "one book rule."  We will, 
however, remand to the district court for resentencing and 
reconsideration in accordance with this opinion. 
_________________________ 
 
 
